THE JURISPRUDENCE
OF JUSTICE MOUNTAIN
Milton B. Conford*
Justice Worrall F. Mountain came to the Supreme Court of New
Jersey March 15, 1971 after an impressive judicial record of some
four years in the Chancery and Appellate Divisions of the Superior
Court. As of this writing, 107 of his opinions are published in the
reports, 81 of those in the Supreme Court, most of them for the
court, the others dissenting and concurring. This work product represents only a fraction of Justice Mountain's contribution to the jurisprudence of this state. His influence in the decisions of the court,
exerted at conferences, and in consultations with colleagues respecting circulated opinions, has been substantial. 1
The measure of an appellate judge's influence on the law must
be taken in terms of his character as well as his scholarship and industry. As highly as in the case of any other judge of his generation,
Justice Mountain commanded respect for impartiality, unswerving intellectual integrity and adherence to principle when at times considerations of convenience or personal predilection may have weighed in
2
a different direction.
As a member of the court, Justice Mountain did not campaign for
votes for the side he favored. When called upon in conference he
stated his position quietly, succinctly and dispassionately. He was
deferential to the opposing views of a brother justice. The justice was
a listener more than a protagonist. He would sometimes pass his turn
in order to hear the views of others before stating his own. However,
as will appear, he could be blunt and caustic in a dissenting opinion.
He would reconsider his position if argument, either by counsel or
colleague, persuaded him he was in error. He was sparing in interrogation of counsel during oral argument, but attentive to the thrust of
questions by his colleagues as well as to the presentation by counsel.

* Former Presiding Judge for Administration of the Superior Court, Appellate Division,
retired.
' The writer has benefited from collegial association with Justice Mountain during extended
periods of time between September 1972 and May 1978 when the writer was temporarily assigned to the Supreme Court. Limitations of time and space preclude discussion of more than a
representative group of Justice Mountain's opinions.
2 In Vreeland v. Byrne, 72 N.J. 292, 370 A.2d 825 (1977), it fell to him to write a four-tothree majority opinion holding unconstitutional the appointment of a friend to the Supreme

Court.
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Justice Mountain's opinions demonstrate a remarkably lucid and
distinctive prose style and a background of solid scholarship in the
law. He has a leaning toward regularity, predictability and consensus
in the law, and therefore a tendency to be guided by the work of the
Commissioners on Uniform State Laws and The American Law Institute, other considerations being equal, where pertinent to the subject
3
matter under consideration.
GENERAL PHILOSOPHY

The popular tendency to classify appellate judges with a oneword adjective as to their "judicial philosophy," e.g., liberal, progressive, activist, conservative, must be rejected in any discussion of
Justice Mountain because no such appellation fits him in any comprehensive sense. All that can be safely said in that regard is that he
is not an "activist"; witness his own reference to judicial activism in a
pejorative sense in two of his most strongly worded and deeply felt
4
dissents.
Probably the most predominant impression gained from a study
of Justice Mountain's opinions is his devotion to principle as he sees
it. To the Justice, principle connotes judicial deference to legislative
hegemony where the subject matter is in the legislative domain; reading statutes and constitutions literally unless their sense and purpose
clearly requires otherwise; and avoidance of result-orientation in decision except, in the development of the common law, when necessary
to meet new societal needs and conditions. Justice Mountain would
approve Professor Wechsler's definition of a "principled decision" as
"one that rests on reasons with respect to all the issues
in the case',
reasons that in their generality and neutrality transcend any im'5
mediate result that is involved."
Justice Mountain's emphasis is upon the function of the judiciary
in resolving disputes and expounding the law rather than in making
law. Above all, the judiciary should abstain from attempts at solving

3 See, e.g., State ex rel. H.B., 75 N.J. 243, 252-53, 381 A.2d 759, 764-65 (1977) (Mountain, J., concurring); Langeveld v. L.R.Z.H. Corp., 74 N.J. 45, 376 A.2d 931 (1977) (Mountain,
J., majority opinion); Data Access System, Inc. v. State, 63 N.J. 158, 164-65, 305 A.2d 427,
430-31 (1973) (Mountain, J., majority opinion).
4 Oakwood at Madison,
Inc. v. Township of Madison, 72 N.J. 481, 628, 371 A.2d 1192,
1266 (1977) (Mountain, J., concurring in part, dissenting in part) (objecting to judicial intrusion
in matters of legislative dominion); Robinson v. Cahill, 70 N.J. 155, 162-66, 358 A.2d 457,
460-62 (Mountain, J., dissenting) (same), injunction dissolved, 76 N.J. 464, 360 A.2d 400 (1976)
[hereinafter cited as Robinson VII]
5
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social and economic problems of the community for which the judicial
process is not designed or appropriate, whether or not the appeal for
involvement is dressed in attractive constitutional garb or based upon
impelling societal needs.
JUDICIAL.ABSTENTION

FROM LEGISLATIVE DOMAIN

Justice Mountain's most characteristic philosophical bent comes
through strikingly in his dissents in three important cases decided by
the court in recent years in the areas of school financing, 6 zoning for
low-cost housing 7 and the public trust doctrine. 8 In each, the Justice
finds unwarranted judicial deprecation of the role of the legislature.
Justice Mountain was a member of the unanimous court for
which Chief Justice Weintraub spoke in declaring violative of the
education clause of the 1947 constitution, article VIII, section IV,
paragraph 1, the existing system of financing public education. 9 That
system was condemned as denying equal educational opportunity to
school children. 10 This, primarily because of discordant correlations
between educational dollars spent and tax ratable bases, per pupil, in
The court subsequently gave the
the respective school districts."
Legislature until December 31, 1974, to enact constitutional legislation on the subject 12 but it took a threatened redistribution of school
6 Robinson v. Cahill, 69 N.J. 133, 174-84, 351 A.2d 713, 735-40 (1975) (Mountain & Clifford, JJ., dissenting), order vacated, 69 N.J. 449, 355 A.2d 129, injunction issued, 70 N.J. 155,
358 A.2d 457, injunction dissolved, 70 N.J. 465, 360 A.2d 400 (1976) [hereinafter cited as
Robinson V].
7 Oakwood at Madison, Inc. v. Township of Madison, 72 N.J. 481, 623-31, 371 A.2d 1192,
1263-67 (1977) (Mountain, J., concurring in part, dissenting in part).
8 Van Ness v. Borough of Deal, 78 N.J. 174, 181-90, 393 A.2d 571, 574-79 (1978) (Mountain, J., dissenting).
9 Robinson v. Cahill, 62 N.J. 473, 303 A.2d 273 (1973), cert. denied, 414 U.S. 976, affd on
rehearing,jurisdiction retained, 63 N.J. 196, 306 A.2d 65 (1973), order entered, 67 N.J. 35, 335
A.2d 6, order entered, 67 N.J. 333, 339 A.2d 193 (1975), republished, 69 N.J. 133, 351 A.2d
713, order vacated, 69 N.J. 449, 355 A.2d 129, injunction issued, 70 N.J. 155, 358 A.2d 457,
injunction dissolved, 70 N.J. 465, 360 A.2d 400 (1976) [hereinafter cited as Robinson 1].The
pertinent provision of the state constitution provides: "The Legislature shall provide for the
maintenance and support of a thorough and efficient system of free public schools for the instruction of all the children in the State between the ages of five and eighteen years." N.J.
CONST. art. VIII, § IV, para. 1.
10 Robinson I, supra note 9, 62 N.J. at 513, 303 A.2d at 294.
11 Id. at 515-16, 520, 303 A.2d at 295-96, 297. Under the existing system, local real estate
taxes were the main source of revenues for each school district. Id. at 480, 303 A.2d at 276.
This arrangement resulted in significant variation between districts in revenues available per
pupil. Id. at 481, 303 A.2d at 276-77.
12 Robinson v. Cahill, 63 N.J. 196, 198, 306 A.2d 65, 66 (1973), order entered, 67 N.J. 35,
335 A.2d 6, order entered, 67 N.J. 333, 339 A.2d 193 (1975), republished, 69 N.J. 133, 351
A.2d 713, order vacated, 69 N.J. 449, 355 A.2d 129, injunction issued, 70 N.J. 155, 358 A.2d
457, injunction dissolved, 70 N.J. 465, 360 A.2d 400 (1976) [hereinafter cited as Robinson II].
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aid, in May of 1975, to force the Legislature to pass a satisfactory
statute. 13 Justice Mountain, along with Justice Clifford, dissented
from the holding that the judiciary had the power to redistribute
school aid.1 4 The dissenters felt that a judicial redistribution to
school districts of legislatively appropriated funds, allocated in a different manner, was violative of the doctrine of separation of powers. 15 They urged the court to "exercise self-restraint," noting that
"restraint derived from a perceived limitation on the judicial
powers . . . maintains some semblance of a working balance between

our three branches of government." 16
Although the court, with the concurrence of Justice Mountain,
upheld the constitutionality of the Public School Education Act of
1975,17 it conditioned its approval on full funding by the Legislature
of the school aid formula contained therein, effective for the school
year commencing July 1, 1976.18 Justice Mountain refused to join in
that condition, 19 apparently adhering to his fundamental view that the
court could not directly or indirectly force the Legislature to exercise
its exclusive constitutional prerogative to appropriate money from the
20
state treasury.
The confrontation between court and Legislature reached a
climax when, by May 13, 1976, the latter body had still not appropriated the monies required to fund the state-aid provisions of the
Public School Education Act of 1975 for the school year commencing
July 1, 1976. After a hearing, the court by a five-to-two majority enjoined the expenditure, with certain minor exceptions, of any funds
for operation of the public schools after July 1, 1976, unless the
Legislature, by that date, had funded the statute or provided other-

13 Robinson V, supra note 6, 69 N.J. at 150-52, 351 A.2d at 721-22. The Legislature finally
adopted an acceptable school financing provision on September 29, 1975. An Act providing for a

thorough and efficient system of free public schools, a State aid program implementing such
system, revising parts of the statutorv law and supplementing Title 18A of the New Jersey

Statutes, [1975] N.J. LAws ch. 212, at 871 (codified at N.J. STAT. ANN. §§ 18A:7A-1 to -33
(West Cum. Supp. 1978-1979)).
14 Robinson V, supra note 6, 69 N.J. at 174-84, 351 A.2d at 735-40 (Mountain & Clifford,
JJ., dissenting).
15 Id. at 180, 351 A.2d at 737-38 (Mountain & Clifford, JJ., dissenting).
16 Id. at 182-83, 351 A.2d at 739 (Mountain & Clifford, JJ., dissenting).
17 N.J. STAT. ANN. §§ 18A:7A-1 to -33 (West Cum. Supp. 1978-1979).
18 Robinson v. Cahill, 69 N.J. 449, 468, 355 A.2d 129, 139, injunction issued, 70 N.J. 155,
358 A.2d 457, injunction dissolved, 70 N.J. 465, 360 A.2d 400 (1976) [hereinafter cited as
Robinson VII.
19 Id. at 449, 355 A.2d at 129 (Mountain, J., concurring in part without opinion).

20 Robinson V, supra note 6, 69 N.J. at 182, 351 A.2d at 739 (Mountain & Clifford, JJ.,
dissenting); N.J. CONST. art. VIII, § II, para. 2.
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wise for a constitutional system of financing the schools.2 1 Although
the court majority acted in this unprecedented fashion in the conviction that otherwise its previous invalidation of the pre-existing system
of financing education would become a vain and useless act, Justice
Mountain, in dissent, protested the court's action as "judicial activism." 22 In his view, notwithstanding judicial perception of "unconstitutional conduct," the courts must stay their hand if correction
of such conduct is the appropriate responsibility of other branches of
government. 2 3 This, he thought, was such a case.
The extent of the Justice's concern with the court's action in closing down the schools was manifested by his assertion that the court
had placed in "serious jeopardy" the judiciary's " 'power of legitimacy,' " based on the public perception of the performance by the
24
organs of government of their functions in an authorized fashion.
By the court's action it had improperly substituted its concept of fiscal priorities in state government for those of the other branches to
25
which the responsibility properly appertained.
A somewhat comparable collision between the court majority and
Justice Mountain eventuated as a sequel to the landmark decision,
Southern Burlington County N.A.A.C.P. v. Mount Laurel,2 6 which
held that developing municipalities must make available to citizens, a
"fair share" of the region's need for low and moderate income housing.2 7 Mount Laurel's zoning regulations effectively precluded low

21 Robinson VII, supra note 4, 70 N.J. at 160, 358 A.2d at 459. The majority of the court
was not prepared to allow the unconstitutional financing system to remain in effect for another

school year. Id. at 159, 358 A.2d at 459. Since the Legislature had failed to fufill its duty to
create a fully operable school financing system, the court felt compelled to grant equitable
relief. Id. at 159-60, 358 A.2d at 459.
The injunction was dissolved July 9, 1976, upon the adoption of legislation for the full
funding of the Education Act. Robinson v. Cahill, 70 N.J. 465, 465, 360 A.2d 400, 400 (1976)
[hereinafter cited as Robinson VIII].
22 Robinson VII, supra note 4, 70 N.J. at 163, 358 A.2d at 461 (Mountain, J.,dissenting).
23 Id. at 161-65, 358 A.2d at 460-62 (Mountain, J., dissenting).
24 Id. at 163-64, 358 A.2d at 461 (Mountain, J., dissenting). Justice Mountain quoted Professor Cox who had defined the "power of legitimacy" as "acceptance and support from the
community" with regard to the actions of government. Id. at 163, 358 A.2d at 461 (Mountain,
J., dissenting) (quoting A. Cox, THE ROLE OF THE SUPREME COURT IN AMERICAN GOVERN-

MENT 103 (1976)). Professor Cox had observed that the judiciary was particularly dependent
upon the power of legitimacy in constitutional litigation because of the consequences to the
public of rulings in such cases. A. Cox, THE ROLE OF THE SUPREME COURT IN AMERICAN
GOVERNMENT 103-04 (1976).
21 Robinson VII, supra note 4, 70 N.J. at 164, 358 A.2d at 461-62 (Mountain, J., dissenting).
26
27

67 N.J. 151, 336 A.2d 713 (1975), appeal dismissed, cert. denied, 423 U.S. 808 (1975).
Id. at 173-74, 336 A.2d at 724-25.
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income families from purchasing housing any place in the township. 28
The court found that the regulations violated state constitutional law
and remanded for ordinance amendment and other appropriate action. 2 9 As in the case of the original Robinson decision, Justice
Mountain joined in the opinion of the court in Mount Laurel except
for the holding therein that the rule of the case was required by the
state constitution. 30 Justice Mountain would have held that the conclusions of the court were justified on the basis of the state zoning
31
statute alone.
When the court was confronted with the first subsequent occasion to implement and enforce the rule of Mount Laurel, in the case
of another municipality whose zoning ordinance had been ruled defective by the Superior Court, Justice Mountain found himself again
in disagreement with the court majority. Reaffirming its adherence to
the principles of Mount Laurel, the court, in Oakwood at Madison,
Inc. v. Township of Madison, 3 2 held that the zoning ordinance of
Madison Township (now Old Bridge) failed to meet Mount Laurel
standards for provision of adequate opportunity for low and moderate
income ("least cost") housing and it remanded for revision of the ordinance in a number of specifically stated particulars under supervision of the trial court. 33 But, as in the case of the school finance
28

Id.

at 169-70, 336 A.2d at 722-23. The residential zoning ordinance mandated minimum

lot sizes, lot frontages, and building size specifications. Id. at 164-69, 336 A.2d at 719-22. The
Supreme Court affirmed the trial court's finding that these regulations were designed to stimulate " 'a selective type of growth,' " which resulted in " 'economic discrimination' " against the
poor who were unable to afford large lots or expensive homes. Id. at 170, 336 A.2d at 170.
29 Id. at 174-91, 336 A.2d at 724-34. The court interpreted the state constitution as requiring zoning regulations to advance the "public health, safety, morals or the general welfare" of
the community, just like any other exercise of the state's police power. Id. at 174-75, 336 A.2d
at 725. Its holding was grounded upon the finding that Mount Laurel's zoning ordinance was
contrary to the "general welfare" of low and moderate income citizens. Id. at 183-85, 336 A.2d
at 729-30.
The court noted that a "general welfare" provision existed in the state's zoning statute but
specifically chose to decide the case on constitutional grounds because of the perceived importance of the question presented by the discriminatory zoning regulations. Id. at 175, 336 A.2d
at 725; see N.J. STAT. ANN. § 40:55-32 (West 1967) (repealed 1976).
30 67 N.J. at 193, 336 A.2d at 735 (Mountain, J., concurring).
31 Id. (Mountain, J., concurring).
32 72 N.J. 481, 371 A.2d 1192 (1977) (Mountain, J., concurring in part, dissenting in part).
33 Id. at 552-54, 371 A.2d at 1227-28. As in the Mount Laurel case, the court found Madison's zoning ordinance invalid since numerous restrictions on lot sizes and housing construction
made it impossible for a family with an annual income of less than $9,000 to purchase a home in
Madison. Id. at 515, 371 A.2d at 1209. In contrast to its remedial action in Mount Laurel,
however, the court, in Oakwood at Madison, decided to supervise the development of a satisfactory zoning ordinance. Id. at 552, 371 A.2d at 1227-28. The court noted that in 1971 the trial
court had correctly informed the township of its obligation to pass a valid zoning ordinance, but
the resultant amended ordinance was unsatisfactory. Id. at 552, 371 A.2d at 1228. Thus, factors
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litigation, what Justice Mountain had been willing to accept as an
abstract principle of law, he was not willing to implement by judicial
decree where such action appeared to him more appropriate for
the legislative than the judicial branch of government. 3 4 Justice
Mountain read the majority opinon as announcing a new rule of law requiring bona fide efforts by municipalities to provide for adequate
low and moderate income housing in the place of the "fair share of the
region" approach of Mount Laurel, and he held the defendant should
be accorded an opportunity at a new trial to demonstrate compliance
with that rule. 3 5 But the heart of his view of the entire Mount
Laurel issue was summed up when he said: "It is the thesis of this
opinion that the solutions of these problems, individually and inthe
aggregate, will be far more speedily and effectively devised by the
Legislature than by the courts." 3 6 He then went on to develop that
proposition effectively. 3 7 It will have occurred to the thoughtful
reader, however, that the difficulties and complexities arising out of
the judicial requirement of zoning for low-cost housing in developing
municipalities, and canvassed in all five of the opinions written in the
Oakwood at Madison case, were inherent under the prior holding of
the court in Mount Laurel, in which Justice Mountain joined.
The jurisprudential question which preoccupied Justice Mountain
is how far judicial remedies should extend to enforce judicial declarations of substantive rights and obligations. The disparity between the
concurring and dissenting views of Justice Pashman and Justice
Mountain in Oakwood at Madison, exemplifies the breadth of the
difference in that regard entertainable by members of the same su38
preme court.
Another tangent of the variant views of Justice Mountain and the
court majority as to the respective responsibilities of the courts and
the legislature arose in the "beach rights" cases, Van Ness v. Borough

such as "the public interest, justice to the plaintiff and efficient judicial administration," necessitated judicial involvement to assure the passage of an acceptable zoning ordinance. Id. at 55253, 371 A.2d at 1228.
14
d. at 623-31, 371 A.2d at 1263-67 (Mountain, J., concurring in part, dissenting in part).
3. Id. at 625, 630-31, 371 A.2d at 1264, 1267 (Mountain, J., concurring in part, dissenting
in part). The majority opinion, Justice Mountain noted, did not order the Township of Madison
to designate a particular area for low and moderate income housing, "nor [did it] fix a fair share
quota" that the township must meet. Id. at 625, 371 A.2d at 1264 (Mountain, J., !concurring in
part, dissenting in part).
36 Id.
at 624, 371 A.2d at 1264 (Mountain, J.,concurring in part, dissenting in part).
37 id. at 624-31, 371 A.2d at 1264-67 (Mountain, J., concurring in part, dissenting in part).
38 Id. at 556-76, 624-30, 371 A.2d at 1229-40, 1263-67 (Pashman, J., concurring in part,
dissenting in part) (Mountain, J., concurring in part, dissenting in part).
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of Deal,39 and Borough of Neptune City v. Borough of Avon-by-theSea. 4 0 The holding in Avon-by-the-Sea was that a municipality
operating a public ocean beach could not discriminate in charges as
between residents and non-residents. 4 1 There were strong implications in the opinion, however, that prior legislative grants of tideflowed beach areas to upland owners were subject to be overridden
by the courts in favor of general public use thereof under the "public
trust" doctrine-a doctrine supposedly unalterable by legislative action. 4 2 The opinion further implied a possible right of the general
public to exercise access to state-owned beach land seaward of the
mean high water mark by passage over privately owned upland. 43 In
a dissenting opinion by Justice Francis, joined by Justice Mountain,
the latter implication was rejected. The opinion suggested that if it
were necessary' to -afford the public access to tide-flowed beaches over
private upland this should be affected by eminent domain, not by
44
application of the public trust doctrine.
In the Deal case, the court majority translated the Avon dictum
into a holding by awarding the general public the right to use that
portion of the municipally owned and artifically created dry beach
which was upland of the mean high water mark-land never historically encompassed by the public trust doctrine. 45 Justice Mountain's
dissent makes the cogent point that it is anomalous that there should
be any right of a public nature which is not subject to constitutional

39 78 N.J. 174, 393 A.2d 571 (1978).
40 61 N.J. 296, 294 A.2d 47 (1972).

41 Id. at 310, 294 A.2d at 55. The court based its decision on an extension of the "public
trust" doctrine which originated at comnon law. Id. at 309, 294 A.2d at 54. Simply stated, the
doctrine vests title to all land covered by tidal waters with the sovereign, but requires that such
property be used for the common benefit and use of the entire public. Id. at 303, 294 A.2d at
51. Historically, this definition covered all land seaward of the high water mark (water line at
high tide). Id. at 303-04, 294 A.2d at 51-52. In applying the doctrine to the Borough of Avon's
attempt to charge non-residents a higher admission fee to its beaches, the court ruled that all
members of the public must have equal access to the ocean and that no preference could be
shown to the residents of Avon. Id. at 308-09, 294 A.2d at 54.
42 Id.
at 303-09, 294 A.2d at 51-55. In a prelude to the discussion of the doctrine's applicability to the case at bar, the court questioned the validity of earlier decisions which held that
the state possessed unlimited power to alienate public trust lands. Id. at 308, 294 A.2d at 54.
The majority obviously felt that the transferring of tidal lands to private persons for their personal use was contrary to the common benefit principle of the doctrine. Id.
43 Id.
44 Id. at 313, 294 A.2d at 56-57 (Francis, J., dissenting). The dissenters noted that in other
states bordering tidal waters, easements have been created to provide the public with access to
the public trust portion of the oceanfront. Id. at 313, 294 A.2d at 56 (Francis, J., dissenting).
45 78 N.J. at 179, 393 A.2d at 573. The court held that, in New Jersey, "the Public Trust
Doctrine requires that the municipally owned upland sand area adjacent to the tidal waters
moust be open to all on equal terms and without preference." Id.
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regulatory control by the Legislature as the elected representatives of
46
the people.
In addition to his dissents in these cases, Justice Mountain has
frequently, in other opinions, stressed the obligation of the courts to
respect the legislative intent rather than indulge their own views as
47
to what is wise or fair.
PROGRESSIVISM

Justice Mountain preeminently carries the banner of modern judicial dedication to modifying the common law where necessary to suit

it to new conditions and realities or where a reevaluation of the
former rule establishes that it no longer conduces to justice.
In Berzito v. Gambino,48 the Justice's opinion for the court established the new principle that if a landlord breaches a covenant of
habitability, express or implied, then, -after reasonable notice by the
tenant, the tenant may recover back from rent already paid the difference in rental value represented by the actual condition of the
premises. 4 9 In Washington Market Enterprises v. Trenton, 50 the
court confronted a factual situation which is increasingly current in an

era of redevelopment of blighted areas. In such areas property values
sharply decline but are generally held non-compensable if the affected property is not actually taken in condemnation. In Washington
46 Id. at 183, 393 A.2d at 576 (Mountain, J., dissenting). Recapitulating his position on
the merits, he said:
To sum up what has happened: The Borough of Deal, using only its own funds,
constructed a beach where there had been no beach before. It did this solely for
the pleasure and benefit of its residents. There was nothing in the law to suggest
that this could not or should not be done. Suddenly the magic wand labeled "public
trust" is gently waved and, lo and behold, what had been a beach reserved solely
for residents of the Borough has been transformed into a beach open to the general
public. It matters not at all in what terms this bit of judicial legerdemain is
couched. The fact remains that one right in the bundle of rights we call ownership
has been destroyed-the right to exclude others. There has been a compensable
taking, accomplished by judicial act. But the judiciary may not exercise the power
of eminent domain!
Id. at 189, 393 A.2d at 578 (Mountain, J., dissenting).
" See Hyland v. Borough of Allenhurst, 78 N.J. 190, 197-98, 393 A.2d 579, 582-83 (1978)
(Mountain, J., dissenting) (control of municipal beach facilities resides in governing municipality, not judiciary); Donaldson v. Board of Educ., 65 N.J. 236, 249-50, 320 A.2d 857, 864 (1974)
(Mountain, J., dissenting) (where statute governs issue under consideration, court should limit
itself to effectuating legislative intent); Data Access Syss., Inc. v. State, 63 N.J. 158, 163-64,
305 A.2d 427, 430-31 (1973) (Mountain, J., majority opinion) (where intent of applicable statute
is clear, courts should follow legislative purpose).
4s 63 N.J. 460, 308 A.2d 17 (1973).
49 Id. at 469, 308 A.2d at 22.
50 68 N.J. 107, 343 A.2d 408 (1975).
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Market, Justice Mountain's unanimous opinion greatly expanded the
concept of what constitutes a compensable "taking" 1 eminent domain, holding that where a public declaration of blight and of intended condemnation substantially destroys the beneficial use of
property there has been a "constructive taking" requiring compensation by the public, even absent an actual taking in eminent domain. 5 '
The interests of fairness between the public and a property
owner were also impelling in the Justice's opinion for the court in
Housing Authority of Atlantic City v. Atlantic City Exposition, Inc., 5 2
where it was held that the same rule as is applicable to construction
of deeds would apply in determining the quantum of land encompassed by a complant in condemnation -the property taken extends to the
middle of the adjoining street even though the description ended at the
53
street sideline.
Justice Mountain's opinions for the court are studded with examples of liberality of approach and of sensitivity to emerging changes in
standards of fairness and as to moral concepts. In Panzino v. Continental Can Co., 54 he gave a petitioner suffering from an occupational
disease the benefit of a retroactive application of a change in the
applicable statue of limitations. 55 The Justice's opinion in Dawson v.

51 Id. at 110, 343 A.2d at 409. The plaintiff, Washington Market Enterprises, owned an
office building in an area of Trenton slated for redevelopment in the early 1960's. Id. at 111,
343 A.2d at 410. It was alleged that as a result of the city's plans, the building became unrentable and the value of the property dropped drastically. Id. at 112, 343 A.2d at 410. Measured by
justice Mountain's sense of fairness, the threat of condemnation caused the property owner to
lose "the beneficial use" for which the building was intended and therefore a "taking" in the
constitutional sense occurred. Id. at 122, 343 A.2d at 416. The trial court's decision granting the
city's motion for summary judgment was reversed and remanded. Id. at 111, 124, 343 A.2d at
409, 417.
52 62 N.J. 322, 301 A.2d 441 (1973).
53 Id. at 328, 301 A.2d at 444. The court noted that it was common practice for a condemnor to use the property boundaries found in a deed in drafting a condemnation complaint.
Id. at 327, 301 A.2d at 444. A condemnor would naturally expect to acquire title to the strip of
condemnee's land subject to a public easement. Id. at 328, 301 A.2d at 444. To hold otherwise,
Justice Mountain felt, would be creating "a trap for the unwary." Id.
- 71 N.J. 298, 364 A.2d 1043 (1976).
55 Id. at 306, 364 A.2d at 1047. The New Jersey Workers' Compensation Act was amended
in July of 1974 to allow claims to be filed anytime within two years after the employee's knowledge of the condition and of its relation to his employment. Id. at 301, 364 A.2d at 1044. The
amended statute had required a claim to be filed within two years of exposure to the harmful
condition or within one year of discovery of the injury, but in no case could a claim be filed
after five years expired since the last exposure. Id. Justice Mountain reasoned that the retroactive application of the amendment was proper and did not violate defendant's right to due
process because the legislature merely expanded "the availability of this statutory right." Id. at
305, 364 A.2d at 1046. The 1974 amendment was not viewed as reopening expired claims but as
enlarging the compensation court's jurisdiction. id. at 306, 364 A.2d at 1047.
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Hatfield Wire & Cable Co., 5 6 granted the status of a dependent
widow to a petitioner in workers' compensation where she had in
good faith entered into a ceremonial marriage with the decedent and
lived with him until his death, notwithstanding he had a previous
undivorced wife. 5 7

In State v. Dorsey, 58 the Justice held that the

unpermitted touching by a man of a woman's body in private was at
59
most simple assault, not the indictable crime of private lewdness.
New Jersey Builders, Owners & Managers Association v. Blair,6 0 was
an opinion by the Justice in which he sustained a general regulation
of the Division on Civil Rights which required the maintenance and
annual reporting to the Division, by owners of apartment houses, of
information as to racial designations of tenants and as to renting practices. 6 1 In response to the contention by the association that the
regulation was violative of the statutory prohibition against making
records as to the race of tenants or applicants for housing, the court
held that where the literal reading of a statute would lead to a result
not in accord with its essential purpose and design, the spirit of the
law would control the letter. 62 Justice Mountain's opinion pointed
out that "Lilt is now generally accepted that, despite earlier statements describing the Constitution as being color blind, . . . those
who seek to end racial discrimination must often be acutely color conscious."63 The statutory regulation was found to have a rational relationship toward the fulfillment of the responsibility to end racial dis64
crimination in housing with which the Division was charged.
Comparable exemplars of Justice Mountain's broad-ranging liberal approach are to be found in such of his opinions as Caribe Hilton

56 59 N.J. 190, 280 A.2d 173 (1971).
51 Id. at 198, 280 A.2d at 177.
58 64 N.J. 428, 316 A.2d 689 (1974).
59 Id. at 433-34, 316 A.2d at 692.
60 60 N.J. 330, 288 A.2d 855 (1972).
61 Id. at 341, 288 A.2d at 86. The regulation was adopted by the Division as an aid to

utilizing the Law Against Discrimination. N.J. STAT. ANN. §§ 10:5-1 to -38 (West 1976 & Cum.
Supp. 1978-1979). However, the plaintiff contended that compliance with the regulation would
violate the statute. Id. at 332, 288 A.2d at 856. Section 10:5-12 specifically forbade property
owners from keeping any records concerning the "race, creed, color, national origin, ancestry,

marital status or sex" of tenants. N.J. STAT. ANN. § 10:5-12 (West 1976 & Cum. Supp. 19781979).
62 60 N.J. at 338, 288 A.2d at 859.
63 Id. at 336, 288 A.2d at 858. In upholding the validity of the regulation, Justice Mountain
endorsed it as a necessary affirmative step aimed at eliminating discrimination in housing. Id. at
335, 288 A.2d at 857-58.
64 Id. at 336, 288 A.2d at 858.
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Hotel v. Toland, 65 State v. Willett Holding Co., 66 Rose v. Port of
68
New York Authority, 6 7 and Berger v. State.
RATIONAL APPROACH TO LEGAL DOCTRINE

A benchmark of Justice Mountain's judicial approach is the constant search for a rational explanation of the rule of law arrived at by
the court. In Hartford Insurance Co. v. Allstate Insurance Co., 69 the
court held that a party who does not seek to appeal a decision in the
Appellate Division to the Supreme, Court cannot later seek the benefit of a subsequent favorable decision on the point in issue by the
Supreme Court, resulting from the appeal by a different part)' similarly circumstanced. 70 Justice Mountain rejected the argument of a
dissenting justice that a contrary result was required by "the need to
do substantial justice" in the case. 7 1 Justice Mountain explained that
the only connection between the two cases was the "wholly fortuitous
one that the appeals were argued together in the Appellate Division. ' ' 7 2 He remarked that "this circumstance affords no rational
basis upon which to rest a decision granting the extraordinary relief
here sought."73 In Helmsley v. Borough of Fort Lee, 74 dealing with
the difficult and complex question of fair administration of a rent control ordinance, Justice Mountain, in a comprehensive opinion,

adhered to the traditional liberality of the court in affording
municipalities wide discretion in controlling rents, but he prohibited
the continuation of a system of enforcement administration which
produced a serious lag between allowable rent increases and in-

65 63 N.J. 301, 307 A.2d 85 (1973) (allowing recovery on gambling debt incurred in Puerto
Rico where such debt was legal obligation).
66 62 N.J. 59, 298 A.2d 69 (1972) (allowing as replacement costs in condemnation of partially

erected building, fees paid to procure necessary construction and permanent financing).
67 61 N.J. 129, 293 A.2d 371 (1972) (applying res ipsa loquitur in negligence action against
Port Authority).
68 71 N.J. 206,. 364 A.2d 993 (1976) (construing restrictive realty covenant not to prohibit

operation of groups home for handicapped children).
69 68 N.J. 430, 347 A.2d 353 (1975).
70 Id. at 435, 347 A.2d at 355.
71 Id. at 436, 347 A.2d at 356. Justice Pashman argued that the petitioner should have been
granted relief under a New Jersey court rule which allowed the court to grant appropriate relief
anytime justice will be served. Id. at 435-36, 347 A.2d 356 (Pashman, J., dissenting); N.J.R.

4:50-1. He saw no reason why the petitioner should have been denied the favorable judgment
that unquestionably would have been his had he filed a timely appeal. 68 N.J. at 436, 347 A.2d
at 356 (Pashman, J., dissenting).

72 Id. at 435, 347 A.2d at 355.
73 Id.

74 78 N.J. 200, 394 A.2d 65 (1978).
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creased costs of operation and thus precluded a fair return on invest75
ment to the landlord.
In DiOrio v. New Jersey Manufacturers Insurance Co., 76 Justice
Mountain in a dissenting opinion upheld the exclusion of coverage in
an automobile policy of a non-owned automobile maintained for the
regular use of one member of the family even though the accident in
question resulted from use of the car by another member of the family. 77 As he persuasively stated, "if general family coverage is intended for such automobiles, they should justifiably be listed on the
family policy so that a separate premium can be charged." 78 In Irval
Realty, Inc. v. Board of Public Utility Commissioners,7 9 Justice
Mountain balanced the right of a plaintiff injured in a gas explosion to
obtain Public Utility Commission records against the Commission's
regulator), policy of withholding records concerning accidents from
the public, and concluded that the plaintiff was entitled to the re80
ports.
A strong objection to what he regarded as an irrational rule of
liability was registered by Justice Mountain in his dissent in the provocative case of Anderson v. Harold Somberg, Inc.8 1 The court was
there confronted with the case of a hospital patient who was injured
when part of a surgical instrument broke off during an operation ai.cl
became embedded in the plaintiff's spinal canal. 82 Joined as defendants were the surgeon, the hospital, the medical supply distributor
75Id. at 209-40, 394 A.2d at 69-86.
76 63 N.J. 597, 311 A.2d 378 (1973) (Mountain, J., dissenting), rev'd 79 N.J. 257, 398 A.2d
1274 (1979).
77 Id. at 609, 311 A.2d at 385 (Mountain, J., dissenting). The automobile involved in the
case was owned by a partnership in which the plaintiffs father was a member. Id. at 600, 311
A.2d at 380. Justice Mountain found that the auto had been provided to the father for his
"regular use," consequently, the automobile qualified as a non-owned vehicle under the family
insurance policy, for which coverage was not available. Id. at 609, 311 A.2d at 385 (Mountain,
J., dissenting).
78 Id. at 613-14, 311 A.2d at 387. Justice Mountain's views in this dissent were later
adopted by the Court. DiOrio v. New Jersey Mfrs. Ins. Co., 79 N.J. 257, 398 A.2d 1274 (1979).
Justice Mountain has tended to be more conservative than the court in the matter of coverage of automobile accident policies. See, e-g., State Farm Mut. Auto. Ins. Co. v. Zurich Am.
Ins. Co., 62 N.J. 155, 182-84, 299.A.2d 704, 718-19 (1973) (Mountain, J., concurring in part,
dissenting in part).
79 61 N.J. 366, 294 A.2d 425 (1972).
80 Id. at 372, 294 A.2d at 428. The PUC argued that requiring it to open its accident files to
the public would discourage suggestions to avoid accidents in the future because of the fear that
such information would be used in damage suits by claimants. Id. at 371, 294 A.2d at 427-28.
Speaking for the unanimous court, Justice Mountain ruled that the plaintiffs right to bring an
action against the gas company for property damage and wrongful death outweighed the "public
interest" in maintaining the confidentiality of accident reports. Id. at 375, 294 A.2d at 429.
81 67 N.J. 291, 305-13, 338 A.2d 1, 8-12 (1975) (Mountain, J., dissenting).
82 Id. at 294, 338 A.2d at 3.
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which furnished the allegedly defective instrument, and the manufacturer of the instrument.8 3 The majority opinion of the court assumed
that all persons or agencies who could have played a causative part in
the breaking of the instrument were defendants in the case, and it
held that the plaintiff was absolutely entitled to a recover), from one
of them, and that the jury must be instructed to that effect.8 4 Justice
Mountain's dissent first points out the probability that certain other
surgeons, not made parties, had used the instrument on prior occasions and that one or more of them might have been responsible for
handling the instrument in such a manner as ultimately to cause it to
break. 85 But passing that point, he observed that, conceding 'that the
doctrine of res ipsa loquitur might apply as to all the defendants and
that the burden of proof could properly be shifted to them, the instruction that the jury must single out one or more defendants to
hold liable, even if they felt that each had individually sustained its
burden of proof, constituted a position "stripped of all rational
basis." 86
CONSTITUTIONAL

LAW

Justice Mountain accorded the same degree of respect to constitutional language as he did to statutory expressions. In a noteworthy case, however, he made the distinction between what Justice
Holmes once called the " 'great ordinances of the Constitution,' . . . includ[ing] the due process clause, the equal protection
clause, the free speech clause [and] most of the other sections of the
Bill of Rights," on the one hand, and "other articles in the Constitution of a different and less exalted quality," on the other. 8 7 The process of interpreting the so-called great ordinances was an evolving
and ongoing one which would permit an interpretation in one era to
83 id. at 295, 338 A.2d at 3.
84 Id. at 303, 338 A.2d at 7.
85 Id. at 306-08, 338 A.2d at 9-10 (Mountain, J., dissenting). It was noted that the instrument in question had been in use for four years when the accident occurred and as many as
twenty surgeons, not parties to the case, may have used the instrument during that time. Id. at
306, 338 A.2d at 9 (Mountain, J., dissenting).
86 Id. at 311, 338 A.2d at 11 (Mountain, J., dissenting). Justice Mountain noted that the
majority's position created the possibility that two directly conflicting instructions might be
given to the jury. He foresaw the jurors first being instructed to arrive at a verdict based on a
preponderance of the evidence and then being ordered to find one or more of the defendants
liable, regardless of whether there is a preponderance of the evidence to support a verdict. Id.
at 311, 338 A.2d at 11 (Mountain, J., dissenting). In such a situation, it might be impossible for
the jury to arrive at a just verdict, and the deliberation process could revert to a "game of
chance.'" Id. at 311-12, 338 A.2d at 11-12 (Mountain, J., dissenting).
87 Vreeland v. Byrne, 72 N.J. 292, 304, 370 A.2d 825, 831 (1977).
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be changed in another in accordance with "the felt needs of the
times." 8 8 But as to the other "less exalted" kinds of provisions, generally dealing with those details of governmental administration as
were deemed worthy of a place in the document, those were required to be construed literally as "the only way that the expressed
will of the people can be assured fulfillment."89 In the latter category, Justice Mountain placed the provision of the state constitution
there in issue, a section that rendered ineligible for appointment to
an office any member of the Legislature, during the term for which
he was elected, if the office was created or the emoluments thereof
increased by law during such term. 90 Reading that provision literally, and speaking for a plurality of the court, Justice Mountain held
it applicable to invalidate the appointment of a legislator to the Supreme Court, notwithstanding that a salary increase for justices of the
Supreme Court adopted during the term of that legislator contained a
provision that it should not apply to any present member of the
Legislature during the term for which he was elected. 9 1 Moreover,
speaking for a majority of the court, Justice Mountain held the provision of the salary increase statute just mentioned to constitute invalid
special legislation. 92
Justice Mountain was confronted on several occasions with the
sensitive problem of construing the constitutional powers of the court
itself with respect to rule making. In Passaic County Probation Officers' Association v. County of Passaic,93 the question raised was
whether probation officers, as employees of the judiciary, were
nevertheless entitled to the benefit of the Employer-Employee Relations Act 9 4 With respect to the provision thereof that proposed new
rules or modifications of existing rules governing working conditions
should be negotiated with the majority representative of the
employees before establishment. 95 The dispute concerned an order
of the chief probation officer of the count\, extending the working

88 Id.

at 304, 370 A.2d at 831.
89 Id. at 304-05, 370 A.2d at 831-32. The sections of the constitution which dealt only with
the management of government did not require any judicial interpretation in the Justice's opinion since the meaning of such provisions could be obtained from a literal reading of the section.
Id. at 305, 370 A.2d at 832.
90 Id. at 305, 370 A.2d at 832; see N.J. CONST. art. IV, § V, para. 1.
91 Id. at 307, 370 A.2d at 833. In so holding, the court aligned itself with the conclusions of
the few out-of-state courts that have considered the issue. Id.
92 Id. at 301, 370 A.2d at 829.
.3 73 N.J. 247, 374 A.2d 449 (1977).
1, N.J. STAT. ANN. § 34:13A-5.3 (West 1965 & Cum. Supp. 1978-1979).
95 73 N.J. at 254, 374 A.2d at 452.
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hours of probation officers to 4:30 p.m. daily instead of the previous
4:00 p.m. 96 This action was taken to conform to a Supreme Court
directive that trial sessions of the courts continue to 4:30 p.m. 97 The
order was made without prior negotiation with the probation officers,
thereby raising the issue as to whether employees of the judiciary
came within the protections of the Employer-Employee Relations
Act. 98 Justice Mountain's opinion for the court held that the, did
not because the court's constitutional rule making and administrative
authority was exclusive and precluded the effect of any contrary stat99
ute.
Nevertheless, the Passaic County Probation Officers opinion
probably met the substance of the statutory requirement of prior
negotiation by virtue of the Justice's invocation of the provision in the
constitution giving all public employees, whether or not employees of
the judiciary, the right to present and make known their grievances. 10 0 The opinion of the court held that the change in work
hours was a "grievance" within the meaning of the constitution and
that the employee representative had the right to present and make
that grievance known to representatives of the judiciary and to be
1 1
accorded good faith discussions on the subject.
In Busik v. Levine, 10 2 however, Justice Mountain found the
court's purported exercise of rule making in a different area not properly within its rule-making jurisdiction, and he dissented from a
majority determination that the disputed rule should stand. 10 3 The
case concerned the validity of Rule 4:42-11(b), adopted by the court
in 1971, requiring the award of prejudgment interest in tort actions.' 0 4 The defendants challenged the validity of the rule as involving a declaration of substantive law contrary to the decision in
Id. at 249, 374 A.2d at 450.
Id.
98 Id. at 250, 374 A.2d at 450.
99 Id. at 255-56, 374 A.2d at 453-54. The holding was based on the provision in the New
Jersey Constitution mandating that the Supreme Court " 'make rules governing the administration of all courts in the State.' " Id. at 255, 374 A.2d at 453; N.J. CONST. art. VI, § II, para. 3.
Since probation officers were found to be an integral part of the judicial system, the court
concluded that they were subject to the regulatory power vested in the supreme court. 73 N.J.
at 254, 374 A.2d at 452.
100 Id. at 256, 374 A.2d at 453-54; see N.J. CONST. art. I, § 19.
101 Id. at 256-57, 374 A.2d at 454. While Justice Mountain acknowledged that the petitioners
could not challenge the finding that hours were not negotiable, he did recognize their right to
request that hours be made negotiable and to have the opportunity to submit arguments in
favor of their position. Id. at 256, 374 A.2d at 454.
102 63 N.J. 351, 307 A.2d 571 (1973).
103 Id. at 385-96, 307 A.2d at 589-95 (Mountain, J., dissenting).
104 Id. at 355, 307 A.2d at 573.
96
97
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Winberry v. Salisbury,10 5 which had held that the Supreme Court had
no power to make substantive law through the exercise of the rulemaking power.' 0 6 The prevailing plurality opinion of the court in
Busik, written by Chief Justice Weintraub, held, first, that the rule
was sufficiently procedural in character as to come within the court's
power to make rules as to practice and procedure; in the alternative,
that the court could and should, in the present instance, adopt the
rule under its power to effect changes in substantive law in the
course of its adjudicatory function. ' 0 7 Justice Mountain objected to
both of those determinations in a trenchant dissenting opinion.108
He proceeded to demonstrate that prejudgment interest, as pertaining to the subject of damages, clearly fell within the category of substantive law.' 0 9 Elaborating on the judiciary's rule-making power in
general, he went on to say:
At the threshold of any consideration of the proper exercise by
the judiciary of its rule-making power is the need to determine the

appropriate philosophical viewpoint which should characterize such
an exercise. As the plurality opinion very correctly states, there is
often no clear line between what is substantive and what pro-

cedural. When faced with such a problem, what should be the
posture of the courts? They should, in my opinion, defer to the

legislature if the matter under consideration can in any clear way
be deemed to affect substantive law. There should be a studied
deference to what I believe to be a legislative supremacy in all

such matters. While I recognize that strict "compartmentalization
of power along triadic
political theorist in an
of powers, vet it does
work of defining the

lines" can probably be achieved only by the
exposition of the doctrine of the separation
remain clear that, while courts share in the
nature of substantive rights and liabilities

105 5 N.J. 240, 74 A.2d 406 (1950).
106

63 N.J. at 364, 307 A.2d at 578; see 5 N.J. at 248, 74 A.2d at 410. The court in Winberry

stated that '[w]hile the courts necessarily make new substantive law through the decision of
specific cases coming before them, they are not to make substantive law wholesale through the

exercise of the rule-making power." 5 N.J. at 248, 74 A.2d at 410.
107 63 N.J. at 362-64, 307 A.2d at 577-78. Referring to its power to effectuate changes in the
substantive law, the court pointed out early in its opinion, that it had a right to decide the
issue, even if promulgation of the rule was an abuse of the court's rule-making power. Id. at

358, 307 A.2d at 575. The plaintiffs, the court noted, had a right to request the relief which the
challenged rule provided; the issue was argued fully, hence, the court had the power to make
an adjudicatory declaration concerning the merits of the questioned relief. Id.
108 Id.
at 385-96, 307 A.2d at 589-95 (Mountain, J., dissenting).
109 Id.
at 388-89, 307 A.2d at 591 (Mountain, J., dissenting). The Justice equated the award-

ing of prejudgment interest with an award of damages and other remedial devices, all of which
he classified as elements of substantive law. Id. at 388, 307 A.2d at 591 (Mountain, J., dissenting).
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when law is determined in the exercise of the adjudicatory process,
such definition not only lies at the very heart of the legislative
process, but is an area of governance where the legislature clearly
has the last word. 110
Passing to the alternative position of the plurality, Justice
Mountain demonstrated that the adopting of the rule under the court's
adjudicatory power to create substantive law was totally inappropriate
in the case before the court."' He made the point that the rule in question had already, been adopted in purported exercise of the court's
rule-making powers, not in an adjudicatory process, and that since
the issue was the validity of the adoption of the rule as a matter of
substantive law in a rule-making context, it was thoroughly inappropriate to use the vehicle of the instant litigation as a purported occasion for the consideration of the merits of the rule in the court's adjudicatory capacity. 11 2 The significant differences between the
court's rule-making and adjudicative functions were determinative,
and the appropriate context for adjudication of substantive law did not
1 13
exist in the case then before the court.

Nevertheless, in Holster v. Board of Trustees of Passaic County
College, 114 Justice Mountain was willing to indulge practical considerations respecting modern public financing problems in construing the
debt limitation clause, article VIII, section II, paragraph 3, of the
115
New Jersey Constitution.
SPECIAL FIELDS OF INTEREST AND EMPHASIS

While members of the Supreme Court other than the Chief Justice do not determine their opinion-writing assignments, the special
interests of individual justices are sometimes recognized by the Chief
Justice, and a justice may' consequently develop a comprehensive
body of law in one field. While the limitations inherent in the present endeavor preclude exploration of all the areas in which Justice Mountain
achieved recognition for special competence, two pertinent categories of subject matter readily come to mind. One is the law pertaining to equitable distribution in matrimonial cases, the other, condemnation law.
110 Id. at 389, 307 A.2d at 591-92 (Mountain, J., dissenting).
"I

Id. at 391-95, 307 A.2d at 592-94 (Mountain, J., dissenting).

112

Id.

153

Id. (Mountain, J., dissenting).

(Mountain, J., dissenting).

114 59 N.J. 60, 279 A.2d 798 (1971).
115 Id. at 71, 279 A.2d at 804. In Holster, the court held that expected future legislative
appropriation was not present debt within the debt limitation clause of constitution since one
legislature cannot bind its successor. Id.; see N.J. CONST. art. VIII, § II, para. 3.
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Justice Mountain wrote several of the leading opinions on equitable distribution after the adoption in 1971 of the statute granting
the courts the power to effectuate an "equitable distribution of the
property, both real and personal, which was legally and beneficially
acquired by [the husband and wife] or either of them during the
marriage." 116
In Rothman v. Rothman, 1 1 7 Justice Mountain held that the statute empowering equitable distribution should be construed as having
retrospective as well as prospective application. 118 So construing the
statute, he found it not to deny due process to the spouse whose
1 19
property was subjected to equitable distribution.
In his seminal opinion in Painter v. Painter,120 Justice Mountain
rejected a challenge to the statute as impermissibly vague and uncertain in its use of the term "equitable" and because it allegedly lacked
sufficient specific criteria as to what property should be eligible for
distribution. 12 ' As to the latter question, the Justice concluded that
certain criteria were readily subject to implication from the statute.
These were: (1) that all property acquired by a spouse during marriage, including gift or inheritance, was eligible regardless of its
116 An Act concerning actions for divorce and

nullity of marriage, alimony, maintenance

and custody of children, [1971] N.J. LAWS, ch. 212, at 1022 (codified at N.J. STAT. ANN. §
2A:34-23 to -27 (West 1952 & Corn. Supp. 1978-1979)); see Carlsen v. Carlsen, 72 N.J. 363,
371 A.2d 8 (1977); Smith v. Smith, 72 N.J. 350, 371 A.2d 1 (1977); Rothman v. Rothman, 65
N.J. 219, 320 A.2d 496 (1974); Painter v. Painter, 65 N.J. 196, 320 A.2d 484 (1974).
117 65 N.J. 219, 320 A.2d 496 (1974).
118 Id. at 231-32, 320 A.2d at 502-3. The statute was designed to provide for all equal
division of marital assets between spouses in the event of a divorce. Id. at 228, 320 A.2d at 501.
The court balanced the interests of the state in effectuating the policies of the remedial legislation against the individual loss that might result from retrospective application of the statute. Id.
at 225-30, 320 A.2d at 499-502. The purpose of the legislation was [o provide the wife in a
divorce action some financial security against the possibility of "becom[ing] a public charge" and
also to recognize the value of a wife's role in the home. Id. at 229, 320 A.2d at 501. Justice
Mountain note(] that the statute has no effect on anyone's property rights until there is a divorce and then any change that occurs will be the result of an " 'equitable' " judgment. Id. at
230, 320 A.2d at 502. Any such loss was deemed minor when measured against the benefits that
would inure to the public as a result of the legislation. Id.
19 Id. at 232, 320 A.2d at 503.
120 65 N.J. 196, 320 A.2d 484 (1974).
121 Id. at 209, 213-14, 320 A.2d at 490-91, 493. In discussing the vagueness issue, the Justice
remarked that
due process requires that the adjudication of a litigant's rights and duties be governed by rules sufficiently clear and objective to guard against an arbitrary result,
and that such rules be sufficiently precise to enable a lawyer to advise a client
intelligently as to the probable results of a proposed course of conduct.
Id. at 208, 320 A.2d at 491. Based on this standard, he concluded that the words " 'equitable
distribution' " were sufficiently definite to withstand a constitutional challenge. Id. at 209, 320
A.2d at 490.
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source; (2) the period of acquisition should be deemed as terminated
on the date the complaint was filed; (3) any property owned by a
spouse at the time of the marriage would remain the separate property of that spouse and not qualify for equitable distribution; (4) the
increment of property owned at the time of the marriage should
likewise be immune; and (5) income from exempt property or any
property in exchange therefore should similarly be considered separate property of the spouse and not subject to distribution. 122 The
framework of the guiding principles thus enunciated have well served
the trial bench in administering thousands of cases of equitable distribution since the decision in Painter.
Smith v. Smith' 2 3 and Carlsen v. Carlsen12 4 dealt with the effect
of property and support agreements executed prior to the equitable
distribution statute on subsequent claims for equitable distribution.
In Smith, Justice Mountain held that a separation agreement entered into prior to divorce did not bar an action under the subsequently enacted equitable distribution statute since the agreement
did not qualify as a fair and equitable property settlement.125 A similar result was reached in Carlsen, where a separation agreement was
1 26
held not to have effectuated a division of marital assets.
Notable opinions by Justice Mountain in the condemnation field
which readily come to mind are Washington Market Enterprises v.
Trenton, 127 Village of South Orange v. Alden Corp.,128 State v.
Township of South Hackensack, 129 Housing Authority of Atlantic City
v. Atlantic City Exposition, Inc.,' 130 State v. Willett Holding Co.,1 3 1
32
and Township of Millburn v. Pitt.1
Throughout Justice Mountain's opinions there is an emphasis on
substance rather than form or semantics. In LeCompte v. State,133 an
122 Id. at 214-18, 320 A.2d at 493-96.
123 72 N.J. 350, 371 A.2d 1 (1977).
124 72 N.J. 363, 371 A.2d 8 (1977).
125 72 N.J. at 358, 371 A.2d at 5. The separation agreement was held to be no more than a

support agreement, with "none of the characteristics of a property settlement." Id.
126 72 N.J. at 370, 371 A.2d at 11. Although the agreement in Carlsen did show some resemblance to a property settlement, the court concluded that there was insufficient evidence to
support a finding that it fulfilled the requirements set forth in Smith to preclude an action for
equitable distribution. Id.
127 68 N.J. 107, 343 A.2d 408 (1975); see notes 50-51 supra and accompanying text.
128 71 N.J. 362, 365 A.2d 469 (1976) (prospective use by municipality of property condemned
is relevent to determination of severance damage of portion of property not taken).
129 65 N.J. 377, 322 A.2d 818 (1974) (in condemnation of portions of public streets condemnor may satisfy claim of defendant municipality by providing substitute facilities).
1- 62 N.J. 322, 301 A.2d 441 (1973); see notes 52-53 supra and accompanying text.
131 62 N.J. 59, 298 A.2d 69 (1972); see note 66 supra.
132 68 N.J. 424, 346 A.2d 601 (1974) (broad construction of municipal power to condemn).
133 65 N.J. 447, 323 A.2d 481 (1974).
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opinion rejecting the complaint of a riparian grantee concerning an
imposition of a charge by the Natural Resource Council for past use
and occupation of the upland in addition to the purchase price, Justice Mountain pointed out that the charge could be considered a part
of the total purchase price which the Council had the right to exact
even if it had no right to impose an assessment for use and occupation. 134 Said the Justice, "[w]e are not slaves to semantics." 135
Notwithstanding his liberality in expounding the dimensions of
the discovery doctrine in Lopez v. Swyer, 1 36 Justice Mountain felt it

necessary to define broadly the class of defendants covered by the
special statute creating a ten-year statute of limitations for the institution of a personal injury action arising out of the defective or unsafe

condition of an improvement to real property.137 After considering
the legislative history, Justice Mountain rejected the contention that
the statute, if construed to bar an action by a person sustaining an
injury more than ten years -after the completion of the construction,

would be unconstitutional special legislation. 138
Those interests favoring expansion of the right of physicians to be
admitted to the staffs of private hospitals have criticized Justice
Mountain's opinion for the court in Guerrero v. Burlington County

Memorial Hospital.139 That case upheld the decision of the board of
trustees of a small satellite hospital to exclude two surgeons from the
medical staff where there was limited bed capacity for surgical patients and the determination was found not to be arbitrary or un40
supported by substantial credible evidence.1
134 Id. at 451-52, 323 A.2d at 483-84. The plaintiff was informed at the time of sale that in
addition to the purchase price, he would be required to pay a lump sum " 'use and occupancy
assessment.' " Id. at 449, 323 A.2d at 482. Justice Mountain viewed the assessment as no more
than a part of the total price of the land. Id. at 451-52, 323 A.2d at 483-84.
135 Id. at 451, 323 A.2d at 483.
136 62 N.J. 267, 300 A.2d 563 (1973).
137 Rosenberg v. Town of North Bergen, 61 N.J. 190, 198, 293 A.2d 662, 666 (1972);
N.J.
STAT. ANN. § 2A:14-1.1 (West Cure. Supp. 1978-1979). The court observed that two developments in the law most likely led to the passage of section 2A:14-1.1. 61 N.J. at 194, 293 A.2d at
664. First, was the advent of the rule that, in certain circumstances, the statute of limitations
does not begin to run until a wrong has been discovered. Id. at 195, 293 A.2d at 664. Second,
was the adoption of a rule that a builder or architect's liability for negligent construction does
not terminate upon completion of the work and acceptance by the owner. id. at 197, 293 A.2d
at 665. The court concluded that the increased exposure to tort liability which these developments brought to builders, architects, etc., served as the impetus for the passage of the special
statute and warranted a broad interpretation, by the court, of the class covered by the statute.
Id. at 198, 293 A.2d at 666.
138 61 N.J. at 201, 293 A.2d at 668.
139 70 N.J. 344, 360 A.2d 334 (1976).
140 Id.
at 349, 360 A.2d at 336. The court recognized the need to allow hospital administrators to exercise discretion in making decisions concerning hospital operations and thus con-
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Justice Mountain was a staunch advocate of the modern New Jersey rule requiring looking toward extrinsic evidence of the testator's
intent in construing a will, even where, as in In re Estate of Ericson, 1 4 1 that process required rejection of an inexplicable contrary express provision of the will. 142
Justice Mountain has a strong sense of the obligation of attorneys
to respect confidential communications. This was exemplified in his
concurring opinion in In re Callan.143 In that case a trial court had
ordered that a fund of moneys withheld by tenants during a rent
strike should not be disbursed to the tenants pending the adjudication of their dispute with the landlord. 144 The appellants, attorneys,
represented the tenants, and were held in contempt by the trial court
for failure to notify the court of the tenants' association's plans to
disburse the funds in advance of the judicial hearing. 1 45 Although a
majority of the Supreme Court reversed the contempt on the ground
that the attorneys had not violated any order of the court, the majority criticized the attorneys for showing "poor judgment" in not notifying the court in advance of their clients' plans. 14 6 In concurrence,
Justice Mountain, joined by Justices Clifford and Pashman, expressed
the view that the appellants were not subject to criticism in that situation. 1 47 Their duty of confidentiality of communications with their
clients precluded informing the court of their clients' plans. 14 8
In the criminal law field, Justice Mountain has been a consistent
adherent of the "law and order" emphasis of the court during the era
of Chief Justice Weintraub. Opinions representative of this emphasis
are State v. Ebron,149 State v. DiCarlo,150 and State ex rel. H.B. 151
In the latter case, Justice Mountain expressed the classic strict constructionist view that, notwithstanding the case implicated important

cluded that judicial interference with this authority was proper only where there has been "an
unreasonable exercise of discretion." Id. at 356-57, 360 A.2d at 340.
141 74 N.J. 300, 377 A.2d 898 (1977).
142 Id. at 303, 377 A.2d at 900.
143 66 N.J. 401, 408-11, 331 A.2d 612, 616-18 (1975) (Mountain, J., concurring).
144 Id. at 403, 331 A.2d at 614.
145 Id. at 405, 331 A.2d at 615.
146 Id. at 407, 331 A.2d at 616. In the court's opinion, the appellants possessed an "obligation
of responsibility and professionalism . . . to the court" which imposed on them a duty to inform
the trial court immediately upon finding out that its order was going to be violated by their
clients. Id.
147 Id. at 410, 331 A.2d at 617 (Mountain, J., concurring).
148 Id.
149 61 N.J. 207, 294 A.2d 1 (1972).
150 67 N.J. 321, 338 A.2d 809 (1975).
151 75 N.J. 243, 381 A.2d 759 (1977) (Mountain, J., concurring).
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fourth amendment rights, "pragmatism should prevail over theoretical
niceties" in such situations because those rights "must be weighed
against . . . the state's interest in protecting the lives and safety of its
citizens." 152
The Supreme Court opinions of Justice Mountain, whether for
the Court, concurring or dissenting, will exert a lasting influence on
the development of the law in this state well out of proportion to his
relatively short service on the court because he not only rendered
decisions but explained them logically, rationally and informatively.
But beyond that service, Justice Mountain's exemplary devotion to
principle and to a keen sense of the appropriate boundaries between
judicial and legislative responsibility will by his example furnish the
always needed reminder to later holders of his high responsibility that
there are such boundaries, whether or not they would agree with
those he eloquently staked out for himself on the Court.

152 Id. at 256, 381 A.2d at 766 (Mountain, J., concurring). The Justice found that police
officers, acting on an anonymous tip that an individual at a luncheonette possessed a gun, had
acted reasonably in conducting a limited search of the defendant who was the only person in the
luncheonette fitting the description of the suspect. Id. at 257, 381 A.2d at 766 (Mountain, J.,
concurring).

